Russia Acquires Vadinar Port In Gujarat , India. Why ?
BY R.K.MISRA
Until October, few
would have imagined that Russia would peacefully acquire in India what it could
not get through a bloody war via Afghanistan in the 1980s: An all-weather, warm
water, deep-draft port, Vadinar, giving it access through the Arabian Sea to
the Indian Ocean.
In the 1980s, a
perceived control of Kabul was a prerequisite for Moscow to reach Gwadar Port
in Balochistan, a project that failed.
Now, however, with the
virtual gift of Vadinar in Deobhoomi Dwarka district of
Gujarat, India has, ironically, fulfilled a three-century-old imperial dream
and colonial ambition of Moscow,writes senior journalist Virendra Pandit in his blog published in The Quint.
I reproduce this
insightful piece by Pandit who heads the Ahmedabad edition of a national
financial daily for it’s sheer strategic depth and understanding of regional
geo-politics.Also appended at the end is a link to the original piece in The
Quint.
BY VIRENDRA PANDIT
In the merciless world
of global diplomacy, geopolitics and self-interest, friendship is directly
proportional to usefulness: Each country keeps its eggs in all possible
baskets. Even India, despite verbal warfare and LoC violations on a daily
basis, has kept all the doors and windows open on Pakistan, including the
status quo on the latter’s MFN status.
Now, Russia also needs
its old foe, China, if only to counter America on issues such as Syria, Ukraine
and Chechnya in the UN. In the Goa BRICS Declaration, therefore, Moscow went
along with Beijing, kept silent on Pakistan terror gangs, and ignored “old
friend” India’s concerns.
The unfolding of
Vadinar diplomacy may point to the emerging macro-political scenario in South
Asia in which, as globally elsewhere, there are no permanent friends or
enemies.
To start with, Saudi
Arabia’s state energy firm Aramco unsuccessfully tried to buy out Essar
refinery; both India and Russia seem to have scuttled the move. And then, it
was ‘unprecedented’ that heads of governments of Russia and India — Vladimir
Putin and Narendra Modi — were witness to the signing of a routine business
deal between Essar Oil and Rosneft and its associates. But, and since this did
happen, therein may lie the importance of Vadinar.
Why Vadinar port, more
than Essar Oil, apparently matters so much to Russia?
Until October, few
would have imagined that Russia would peacefully acquire in India what it could
not get through a bloody war via Afghanistan in the 1980s: An all-weather, warm
water, deep-draft port, Vadinar, giving it access through the Arabian Sea to
the Indian Ocean.
In the 1980s, a
perceived control of Kabul was a prerequisite for Moscow to reach Gwadar Port
in Balochistan, a project that failed.
Now, however, with the
virtual gift of Vadinar in Deobhoomi Dwarka district of
Gujarat, India has, ironically, fulfilled a three-century-old imperial dream
and colonial ambition of Moscow.
The Vadinar Port, and
its associated facilities spread over some 2,300 hectares (23 sq km), receives
nearly 70 percent of India’s crude oil imports. But that is a small, even
collateral, issue for Russia.
Russia’s aspiration
for the Indian Ocean is as old as its imperial capital, St Petersburg, itself.
Until Peter the Great (1682-96), Russia was the frozen eastern and
north-eastern end of Europe. Peter commenced its eastward expansion in Asia in
that colonial era; by the mid-19th century, Russia expanded relentlessly up to
Vladivostok in eastern Asia, so much so that it came to be seen as mainly an
Asian country with a European soul. Its ruthless Orthodox Christian Tsars were,
in Europe, even known as “Khans”.
Russia’s
Quest For Warm Water Ports
St Petersburg’s Far
East Asia expansion was inevitable as other colonial powers of Europe had
sliced up the “world” into their spheres of colonial influence and financially
poor but resource-rich Russia was left with the frozen Siberia to chew upon.
Most of its various frozen ports remained closed for better part of the year,
making international trade impossible.
Peter, and then
Catherine the Great (1762-1796), therefore, formulated and followed the state
policy of acquiring all-weather, warm water ports elsewhere to conduct their
colonial and business objectives.
But Russia could not
succeed, as encircling colonial Europe and neo-colonial Japan reached South
China Sea as well by the beginning of the 20th century. Japan even defeated
Russia in a naval war there in 1904.
Despite communism and
its “anti-colonial” propaganda, the Russian government’s medieval policy of
acquisition of warm-water ports continued in the 20th century Soviet era as
well. This was strengthened by the “Brezhnev Doctrine”, envisaging that Moscow
would “protect friendlysocialist countries” even if by force.
Wearing this “legal”
mask, Russia had already invaded Hungary (1956) and then Czechoslovakia (1968).
But, due to the America-led encirclement treaties like NATO, CENTO etc.,
Russia’s quest for warm water ports through expansion in Europe was not
possible.
After the British left
India in 1947, Moscow saw an opening in this region; the British Raj had kept
Moscow in check in South Asia for two centuries. In the 1970s-80s, “friendly”
governments in Afghanistan and India (which was also now a “Sovereign, Secular, Socialist,
Democratic Republic” thanks to the 42nd Constitutional Amendment, 1976!) gave
Russia an opportunity to seek an “invitation to protect socialism” in
Afghanistan.
With the apparent aim
of eventually acquiring Gwadar in Balochistan, Moscow invaded Afghanistan in
the 1980s. But Washington and Islamabad frustrated this game-plan by using
Taliban guerillas and then invasion of Afghanistan.
Now, with Pakistan
facilitating the Chinese control of Gwadar, by crushing its own Baloch rebels,
the South Asian geopolitics is set to undergo a sea change. It would facilitate
the Gulf region’s energy flow to energy hungry Beijing via the China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC). Russia, too, needed an alternative to Gwadar. And she
may have found one in Vadinar.
London,
Washington’s Watchful Eye
Both
London/Washington, on one hand, and Beijing, on the other, have been
historically apprehensive of the Polar Bear fishing in the warm water Arabian
Sea, and, by implication, in the Indian Ocean. That was, apparently, why
America turned a Nelson’s Eye to China acquiring Gwadar from Pakistan as,
Washington believed, it would create a balance of power in the strategically
unstable, terror-infested and nuclear-armed region having no NATO-type security
umbrella.
Despite India’s
alleged “bonhomie” with Washington, the USA would not, therefore, disturb the
terror-Army-ISI gangs in Islamabad – except in Afghanistan-specific matters
such as the Taliban and the Haqqani networks – if only to keep in check the
off-and-on Moscow-New Delhi “axis”.
In other words,
Washington is more interested in protecting the Durand Line between Pakistan
and Afghanistan than the Radcliff Line between India and Pakistan, which
explains why America would not go beyond lip service on Kashmir.
Because of this same
reason, Beijing, despite its growing business in India, would continue to
support Jaish-e-Muhammed and other Islamabad-controlled “non-state” actors, and
oppose India’s claims on NSG, to keep New Delhi on tenterhooks.
The
Fluctuating Alliances
Not that some
Pakistanis are not concerned at China’s sweet game on Gwadar. The daily Dawn recently
quoted Senator Tahir Mashhadi, Chairman of an Upper House Committee, as saying
that China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) could become a new East India
Company! Also, some Pakistani lawmakers expressed concern that China could
eventually use the $46 billion, 2,442 km long CPEC to boost its trade with
India, a far bigger market than one that Islamabad offers!
And, aware of
Pakistan’s mercurial politics, Chinese Ambassador to Islamabad Sun Weidong
recently rushed to Imran Khan in an apparent bid to protect the mammoth
investment in CPEC, ahead of the former cricketer’s party planning to stage a
blockade in Pakistani cities against the Nawaz Sharif government.
Thus, South Asian
geopolitics, involving global powers, is once again pitching India and Russia
on one side and (America)-China-Pakistan on the other – these temporary
alliances may fluctuate one way or another. If energy-guzzler India is
‘reinventing’ its 1971 friendship with Moscow, Washington has no qualms in
silently watching another energy-deficient, China, gobble up warm water port of
Gwadar for the Gulf crude.
Interestingly, India
has termed the Rs 86,000 crore Essar-Rosneft deal as the biggest FDI event in
the country’s history. But, in the long run, this “FDI” may turn out to be more
of an Indo-Russian port exchange plan than a debt-retirement scheme for Essar.
It may not create any
fresh jobs — on the contrary, since the Essar refinery would now, for all
practical purposes, be a Russian-controlled company, Moscow could conveniently
restructure and redeploy the existing staff, thus curtailing Indians’ job
opportunities!
In other words, Russia
has settled Essar’s debt in exchange for acquiring Vadinar Port and the
adjoining refinery. Thus, Moscow has almost ‘purchased’ Vadinar Port in the
Gulf of Kutch — from India! This is also borne out by the fact that Rosneft’s
partner, United Capital Partners (UCP), a major Russian private investment
group, has reportedly said it may sell its stake in the $12.9 billion deal
within five years.
In that case, it would
increase the stake of Rosneft from 49 percent now to 73.5 percent; Trafigura, a
Russo-Dutch energy company, would own 24.5 percent, and Essar the remaining 2
percent of the stake – and they may, too, exit subsequently.
Rosneft boss Igor
Sechin is an ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin. This circuitous route
was apparently adopted to bypass Western sanctions against Russia in the
Syrian, Crimean and Ukrainian matters.
Neo-Colonialism
– 21st Century Style
So, could Vadinar
become a Russian port by 2021? Wait!
But there is also a
national security angle to this India-Russia deal. In 1999, at the height of
the Kargil conflict, the Jamnagar-based refineries of Reliance and Essar Groups
were said to be among the targets of Pakistan Air Force (PAF); in 2016,
however, Islamabad dare not target the Russian (Essar) refinery in Jamnagar!
Even if it chooses to target the Reliance refinery, it will have to overfly
both Vadinar Port and Essar’s refinery.
India may have lost a
refinery to Russia and gained a security cover for another; on the other hand,
Russia has got a foothold at Vadinar, in the Gulf of Kutch, in the Arabian Sea
— and into the Indian Ocean. And China is handling Islamabad like crockery for
the sake of Gwadar.
Welcome to
neo-colonialism in South Asia in the 21st century!
Comments
Post a Comment